We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly e®ective groups of players and their distance from exact e®ectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partitionbalanced pro¯les and approximately partition-balanced pro¯les. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
Introduction.
We introduce the notion of parameterized collections of games and show that, under apparently mild conditions, approximate cores of all su±ciently large games without side payments are nonempty. A collection of games is parameterized by (a) the number of approximate types of players and the goodness of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly e®ective groups of players and their distance from exact e®ectiveness. All games described by the same parameters are members of the same collection. The conditions required on a parameterized collection of games to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores are merely that most players have many close substitutes and all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups of players bounded in size (small group e®ectiveness). For our¯nal result, we also require per capita boundedness, which simply rules out arbitrarily large average payo®, and that transfers of payo® between players, although not necessarily at a one-to-one rate, are possible. The condition of small group e®ectiveness may appear to be restrictive but, in fact, in the context of a \pregame," if there are su±ciently many players of each type, then per capita boundedness and small group e®ectiveness are equivalent (Wooders [67] ).
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As an application of our research, we develop a new model of an economy with clubs and obtain analogues of our nonemptiness results for games. Following Buchanan [8] and Shubik and Wooders [52] , we allow individuals to belong to multiple clubs and clubs may be as large as the entire player set. In contrast to prior research in this area, our model allows utilities from forming a club to be directly a®ected by the size and composition of the economy containing the club. For example, there may be widespread externalities.
Turning to the motivation for our research, it is well understood that except in highly idealized situations cores of games may be empty and competitive equilibrium of economies may not exist. For example, within the context of an exchange economy, the conditions required for existence of equilibrium typically include convexity, implying in¯nite divisibility of commodities, and also nonsatiation. Even these two conditions may well not be satis¯ed; goods are usually sold in pre-speci¯ed units and there are some commodities that many individuals prefer not to consume. In economies with congestion, even if preferences and production technologies are convex, the core of the economy may be empty. 2 In the context of economies with coalition structures, such as economies with clubs and/or local public goods, the added di±culties of endogenous group formation compound the problem; even if, given club memberships, all conditions for existence of equilibrium and nonemptiness of the core are satis¯ed in each club, the core may be empty. One possible approach to the problem of existence of equilibrium is to restrict attention to models where equilibria exist, for example, economies with continuums of agents. But a model with a continuum of agents can only be an approximation to a¯nite economy. Another approach is to consider solution concepts for which existence is more robust, for example, approximate equilibria and cores. It seems reasonable to suppose that there are typically frictions that prevent attainment of an exact competitive equilibrium. At any time, most markets may have some unsatis¯ed demand or supply and most purchases might be made at prices that are only close to equilibrium prices. It also seems reasonable to suppose that there are typically costs of forming coalitions. These sorts of observations motivate the study of existence of approximate equilibria and nonemptiness of approximate cores.
Besides assumptions on the structure of the economies or games considered, solution theory also requires behavioral assumptions { the competitive equilibrium requires that individuals take prices as given (by some unknown source) and optimize while the core is based on the idea that if a group of individuals can be better o® by forming a coalition and reallocating resources and activities within that coalition, then they will do so. These behavioral assumptions are problematic, those of the core perhaps no more so than those of the competitive equilibrium. An alternative to the behavioral assumption of the core that may be easier for economists to swallow is that entrepreneurs form coalitions whenever there exists an opportunity to pro¯t from doing so; there is a long literature taking this approach or closely related approaches, for example, Pauly [42] , Shapley and Shubik [49] , [58] and Bennett and Wooders [5] . 3 The literature on contestable markets, for example, Baumol, Panzer and Willig [4] takes a similar approach; roughly this literature suggests that the presence of entrepreneurs who are ever-ready to enter a market if there is an opportunity to pro¯t ensures that prevailing prices are perfectly competitive. Thus, there is some motivation for both the core and the competitive equilibrium in the idea that if prices/payo®s are not competitive, pro¯t maximizing¯rms will enter. From the viewpoint of the behavioral assumptions required, there are arguments in favor of both the core and the competitive equilibrium.
Since the seminal papers of Shubik [50] , Debreu and Scarf [17] and Aumann [3] , equivalence of the core and price-taking equilibrium and approximate equivalence has been shown in a variety of contexts, including in economies with coalition production (Hildenbrand [24] and BÄ ohm [6] for example), in economies with public goods (Conley [9] and Vasil'ev, Weber and Wiesmeth [55] for example), economies with local public goods or clubs (several papers referenced herein { see [69] for further references) and in 3 Pauly treats the case of essentially identical players and economies with quasi-transferable utilities. Wooders [58] treats multiple types; these results are applied in Bennett and Wooders [5] to problems of¯rm formation. For NTU games, it can be shown that under certain conditions, the core is equivalent to a \no-entry" equilibrium (a typescript with such results is available on request from the second author).
Shapley and Shubik [49] made an important connection between games with side payments and markets, de¯ned as economies with quasi-linear preferences and concave utility functions.
economies with¯nite coalitions and widespread externalities (Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [23] and Hammond [22] for example). Indeed, with quasi-linear utilities, large economies, including those with nonconvexities, indivisibilities, coalition production, public projects and clubs are equivalent to markets if and only if small groups are e®ective for the realization of all or almost all gains to coalition formation ( [67] ). All these results suggest that in diverse large economies, approximate cores are nonempty and close to competitive outcomes. These results also all depend on structures of speci¯c economic models. The study of cores of general large games allows us to demonstrate that certain properties of large economies depend only on a few features of the model, most notably, small group e®ectiveness.
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The game theoretic environment we consider may be especially well suited to the core. Since the games treated have many players of each of a relatively few approximate types, informally, we might expect that some random sorting process and bargaining may lead to optimal outcomes. In the context of exchange economies, results in this spirit have been obtained by a number of authors, for example, Dagan, Serrano and Volij [15] .
To position our model and results in the literature, recall that Shapley and Shubik [48] showed that large replica exchange economies with quasi-linear preferences have nonempty approximate cores. Under the assumption of per capita boundedness {¯niteness of the supremum of average payo® { Wooders [59] , [62] demonstrated nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games with and without side payments. Since then, there have been a number of advances in this literature, including Shubik and Wooders [54] , Kaneko and Wooders [27] , and Wooders and Zame [70] . The prior literature on approximate cores of large games all uses the framework of a pregame. A pregame consists of a compact metric space of player types, possibly¯nite, and a worth function ascribing a payo® possibilities set to every possible group of players. The worth function depends continuously on the types of players in a coalition. Note that the pregame framework treats collections of games that can all be described by a single worth function. This has hidden consequences; for example, as we will illustrate, the equivalence between small group e®ectiveness and per capita boundedness noted above depends on the structure of a pregame. Moreover, the pregame framework dictates that the payo® set of a coalition cannot depend on the total player set of the game in which it is embedded; widespread externalities are ruled out.
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To illustrate how parameterized collections can treat a broader class of situations than pregames, consider, for example, a sequence of economies where the nth economy has n identical players. Suppose that, due to widespread externalities, in the nth economy a group consisting of m players can realize a payo® of m(1 + 1=n). The pregame framework rules out such sequences of games, where the payo® to a group of players depends on the total player set in which it is embedded. In contrast, parameterized collections of games incorporate games with widespread externalities and our results can be applied. 6 This example also illustrates that our club-theoretic results cannot be obtained in the pregame context.
In the remainder of this introduction, we¯rst discuss our game-theoretic framework and results in more detail and then discuss economies with clubs. Related literature is discussed in the body of the paper.
The game-theoretic model and results.
We provide three theorems showing nonemptiness of approximate cores of arbitrary games. Given the speci¯cation of an approximate core { the particular approximate core notion and the parameters describing the closeness of the approximation { we obtain a lower bound´on the number of players so that any game in the class of games described by the speci¯ed parameters with at least´players has a nonempty approximate core. While our three theorems each use di®erent notions of approximate cores, both the notions of approximate cores and the theorems build on each other. Our framework encompasses games derived from pregames with or without side payments and our results encompass, as special cases, a number of nonemptiness of approximate core results in the literature. In the concluding section of the current paper we remark on other applications of the notion of parametrized collections of games.
Our¯rst result, for the "-remainder core, requires a¯nite integer number T of types of players and a bound B on strictly e®ective group sizes.
7 Roughly, a payo® vector is in the "-remainder core if it is in the core of a subgame containing all but a fraction " of the players. Our result provides a lower bound, depending on T; B; and ", on the number of players required to ensure nonemptiness of the "-remainder core for all games with T types and bound B on e®ective group sizes: An important aspect of this result, like the result of Kaneko and Wooders [27] , is that the conclusion is independent of the payo® sets for the games. The result is eminently applicable to models with bounded coalition sizes, such as marriage and matching games (cf., Kelso and Crawford [32] or Roth and Sotomayor [44] ).
The "-core of a game is the set of feasible payo® vectors that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players by at least " for each member of the coalition. A feasible payo® vector is in the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core if it induces a payo® vectors in the " 2 -core of a subgame containing all but a fraction " 1 of the players. Our nonemptiness theorem for the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core requires only that groups bounded in size are e®ective for the realization of almost all gains to cooperation. Instead of the assumption of a¯nite number of types, to show nonemptiness of the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core we require only that there be a partition of the set of players into a¯nite number of approximate types. Such an assumption would be satis¯ed by games derived from a pregame with a compact metric space of player types, for example.
Under two additional restrictions on the class of games, we obtain a nonemptiness result for "-cores. The restrictions are that: (a) per capita payo®s are bounded; and (b) the games are strongly comprehensive in the sense that the boundaries of the total payo® set are bounded away from being \°at". Per capita boundedness dictates that average payo® is bounded. Strong comprehensiveness, called q-comprehensiveness with q bounded away from zero, dictates that it is possible to make transfers to the \remainder" players of the previous theorems. Since per capita payo®s are bounded, in games with su±ciently many players it is possible to transfer su±ciently large amounts of payo® to the remainder players so that they will cannot form an improving coalition. A corollary relaxes assumption (b).
Economies with clubs.
There are now numerous papers in the literature studying cores and equilibria of economies with local public goods, where a feasible state of the economy includes a partition of the set of agents into disjoint jurisdictions or clubs for the purposes of collective consumption of public goods within each club or jurisdiction.
8 There have been far fewer works on economies where an agent can belong to multiple clubs. In this paper we develop a model of an economy with clubs where: (a) a player may belong to multiple clubs { indeed, as many clubs as there are groups containing that player; (b) all players may di®er from each other; (c) each club may provide a unique bundle of goods and/or services, including private goods, public goods subject to exclusion, and conviviality; and (d) the payo® set of a club may depend on the economy in which it is embedded { widespread externalities are permitted.
A club is a group of people who collectively consume and/or produce a bundle of goods and/or services for the members of the club. Often clubs have been treated as synonymous with groups/jurisdictions of players providing congestable and excludable public goods for their members where, in addition, the production possibilities and preferences may depend on the membership of the jurisdiction providing the public goods,`Tiebout economies'. We observe, however, that clubs engage in a variety of activities. These activities may or may not require input of private goods. The goods provided by the club may include the enjoyment of the company of the other club members. In clubs of intellectuals, the exchange of ideas may be the aspect of the club that brings enjoyment to its members. Clubs may provide only private goods; for example, many academic departments have co®ee clubs. Other clubs o®er some goods and/or services to the general public. Some sorts of clubs o®er private goods and/or services to their members in addition to public goods. There is frequently no requirement that members of the same club consume the same bundles of goods. Thus, in this paper for each club we assume that there is an abstract set of feasible club activities.
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It may be the case that some sorts of clubs are ruled out for legal, technical, or social reasons. For example, a marriage may be viewed as a club, and polyandrous marriages may be illegal. Thus, for each group of players in the economy there is an admissible club structure of that group. Admissible club structures are required to satisfy certain natural properties. In addition, for our¯nal result, our model is required to satisfy the conditions that: (a) average utilities are bounded independently of the size of the economy; and (b) as the economy grows large, increasing returns to club size must become negligible.
Although the conditions on our model are remarkably non-restrictive, by application of our game-theoretic results we are able to show several forms of the result that approximate cores of large economies { with su±ciently many players { are nonempty. Our result applies simultaneously to all games in a parameterized collection.
Organization of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic de¯nitions, including the notion of parametrized collections of games. Section 3 presents our three theorems on nonemptiness of approximate cores in the order presented above. Section 4 consists of our club model and results. Section 5 concludes the body of the paper. Appendix contains the proofs that are based on a new mathematical result on approximate balancedness of large pro¯les of player sets.
2 De¯nitions.
Cooperative games: description and notation.
Let N = f1; :::; ng denote a set of players. A nonempty subset of N is called a group.
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For any group S let R S denote the jSj-dimensional Euclidean space with coordinates indexed by elements of S. For x 2 R N ; x S will denote its restriction to R S . To order vectors in R S we use the symbols >>; > and¸with their usual interpretations. The non-negative orthant of R S is denoted by R S + and the strictly positive orthant by R S ++ . We denote by1 S the vector of ones in R S , that is,1 S = (1; :::; 1) 2 R S . Each group S has a feasible set of payo® or utility vectors denoted by V S ½ R S . By agreement, V ; = f0g and V fig is nonempty, closed and bounded from above for any i. In addition, we will assume that
this is by no means restrictive since it can always be achieved by a normalization.
It is convenient to describe the feasible payo® vectors of a group as a subset of R N . For each group S let V (S), called the payo® set for S, be de¯ned by
A game without side payments (called also an NTU game or simply a game) is a pair (N; V ) where the correspondence V :
for any S ½ N and satis¯es the following properties :
(2.1) V (S) is nonempty and closed for all S ½ N .
+ is bounded for all S ½ N , in the sense that there is a real number
We next introduce the uniform version of strong comprehensiveness assumed for our third approximate core result. Roughly, this notion dictates that payo® sets are 10 In cooperative game theory the term \coalition" is typically used instead of \group"; this is consistent with an emphasis on cooperative behavior. To describe our model, we prefer the term \group" since what a group could do were its members to decide to cooperate is quite distinct from the assumption that the group actually forms a coalition. A referee, however, was concerned that the use of the two terms, \group" to describe simply a subset of players, and \coalition" for a group that forms an alliance, may be confusing so for the remainder of the paper we use only the term group.
both comprehensive and uniformly bounded away from having level segments in their boundaries. Consider a set W ½ R S . We say that W is comprehensive if x 2 W and y · x implies y 2 W . The set W is strongly comprehensive if it is comprehensive, and whenever x 2 W; y 2 W; and x < y there exists z 2 W such that x << z:
11 Given (i) x 2 R S , (ii) i; j 2 S, (iii) 0 · q · 1 and (iv) "¸0; de¯ne a vector x q i;j (") 2 R S ; where
The set W is q-comprehensive if W is comprehensive and if, for any x 2 W , it holds that (x q i;j (")) 2 W for any i; j 2 S and any "¸0. 12 For q > 0 this condition uniformly bounds the slopes of the Pareto frontier of payo® sets away from zero. Note that for q = 0; 0-comprehensiveness is simply comprehensiveness. Also note that if a set is q-comprehensive for some q > 0 then the set is q 0 -comprehensive for all q 0 with 0 · q 0 · q:
S be the smallest q-comprehensive set that includes the set V S . 13 For V (S) we de¯ne the set c q (V (S)) in the following way:
Notice that for the relevant components { those assigned to the members of S { the set c q (V (S)) is q-comprehensive, but not for other components. With some abuse of terminology, we will call this set the q-comprehensive cover of V (S): When q > 0 we can think of the payo® set as having some degree of \side-paymentness" or as allowing transfers between players, not necessarily at a one-to-one rate, but at a rate q bounded away from zero (and not greater than one). A game with side payments (also called a TU game) is a game (N; V ) with 1-comprehensive payo® sets, that is V (S) = c 1 (V (S)) for any S ½ N: This implies that for any S ½ N there exists a real number v(S)¸0 such that V S = n x 2 R S :
The numbers v(S) for S ½ N determine a function v mapping the subsets of N to R + . Then the TU game is represented as the pair (N; v). 11 Informally, if one person can be made better o® (while all the others remain at least as well o®), then all persons can be made better o®. This property has also been called \nonleveledness" and \quasi-transferable utility." 12 The notion of q-comprehensiveness can be found in Kaneko and Wooders [30] . For the purposes of the current paper, q-comprehensiveness can be relaxed on portions of the payo®s sets not contained in the positive orthant. 13 Notice that there exist q-comprehensive sets that contain V S , speci¯cally R S : The set W q S is the intersection of all q-comprehensive sets containing V S .
Parameterized collections of games.
To introduce the notion of parameterized collections of games we will need the concept of Hausdor® distance. For every two nonempty subsets E and F of a metric space (M; d); de¯ne the Hausdor® distance between E and F (with respect to the metric d on M), denoted by dist(E; F ), as
Since payo® sets are unbounded below and payo®s that assign any player an amount signi¯cantly less than zero are not relevant for our results, we will use a modi¯cation of the concept of the Hausdor® distance so that the distance between any two payo® sets is the distance between the intersection of the sets and a subset of Euclidean space bounded below. Let m ¤ be a¯xed positive real number. Let M ¤ be a subset of Euclidean space R N de¯ned by
For every two nonempty subsets E and F of Euclidean space
The concepts de¯ned below lead to the de¯nition of parameterized collections of games. To motivate the concepts, each is related to analogous concepts in the pregame framework.
±¡substitute partitions: In our approach we approximate games with many players, all of whom may be distinct, by games with¯nite sets of player types. Observe that for a compact metric space of player types, given any real number ± > 0 there is a partition (not necessarily unique) of the space of player types into a¯nite number of subsets, each containing players who are \±-similar" to each other. Parameterized collections of games do not restrict to a compact metric space of player types, but do employ the idea of a¯nite number of approximate types. Let (N; V ) be a game and let ±¸0 be a non-negative real number. A ±-substitute partition is a partition of the player set N into subsets with the property that any two players in the same subset are \within ±" of being substitutes for each other. Formally, given a set W ½ R N and a permutation ¿ of N , let ¾ ¿ (W ) denote the set formed from W by permuting the values of the coordinates according to the associated permutation ¿. Given a partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; T g of N , a permutation ¿ of N is type ¡ preserving if, for any i 2 N; ¿ (i) belongs to the same element of the partition fN [t]g as i. A ±-substitute partition of N is a partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; T g of N with the property that, for any type-preserving permutation ¿ and any group S,
Note that in general a ±-substitute partition of N is not uniquely determined. Moreover, two games may have the same partitions but have no other relationship to each other (in contrast to games derived from a pregame).
(±,T )-type games. The notion of a (±,T )-type game is an extension of the notion of a game with a¯nite number of types to a game with approximate types.
Let ± be a non-negative real number and let T be a positive integer. A game (N; V ) is a (±; T )-type game if there is a T -member ±-substitute partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; T g of N . The set N [t] is interpreted as an approximate type. Players in the same element of a ±-substitute partition are ±-substitutes. When ± = 0; they are exact substitutes.
pro¯les. Another notion that arises in the study of large games is that of the pro¯le of a player set, a vector listing the number of players of each type in a game. This notion is also employed in the de¯nition of a parameterized collection of games, but pro¯les are de¯ned relative to partitions of player sets into approximate types.
Let ±¸0 be a non-negative real number, let (N; V ) be a game and let fN [t] : t = 1; ::; T g be a partition of N into ±-substitutes. A pro¯le relative to fN [t]g is a vector of non-negative integers f 2 Z T + and a subpro¯le s of a pro¯le f is a pro¯le satisfying the condition that s · f . Given S ½ N the pro¯le of S is a pro¯le, say
A pro¯le describes a group of players in terms of the numbers of players of each approximate type in the group. Let kf k denote the number of players in a group described by f , that is, kf k = P f t .
¡e®ective B¡bounded groups: In all studies of approximate cores of large games, some conditions are required to limit gains to collective activities, such as per capita boundedness and/or small group e®ectiveness, as in [59] , [62] , [66] , [67] , or the more restrictive condition of boundedness of individual marginal contributions in boundedness of marginal contributions to groups, as in Wooders and Zame [70] . Small groups are e®ective if all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups bounded in size of membership. The following notion formulates the idea of small e®ective groups in the context of parameterized collections of games.
Informally, groups of players containing no more than B members are¯-e®ective if, by restricting groups to having fewer than B members, the loss to each player is no more than¯: Let (N; V ) be a game. Let¯¸0 be a given non-negative real number and let B be a given positive integer. For each group S ½ N; de¯ne a corresponding set V (S; B) ½ R N in the following way:
The set V (S; B) is the payo® set of the group S when groups are restricted to have no more than B members. Note that, by superadditivity, V (S; B) ½ V (S) for any S ½ N and, by construction, V (S; B) = V (S) for jSj · B. We might think of c q (V (S; B)) as the payo® set to the group S when groups are restricted to have no more than B members and transfers are allowed between groups in the partition. If the game (N; V ) has q-comprehensive payo® sets then c q (V (S; B)) ½ V (S) for any S ½ N: The game (N; V ) with q-comprehensive payo® sets has¯-e®ective B-bounded groups if for every group
When¯= 0, 0-e®ective B-bounded groups are called strictly e®ective B-bounded groups.
parameterized collections of games G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)). With the above de¯nitions in hand, we can now de¯ne parameterized collections of games. Let T and B be positive integers, let ± and¯be nonnegative real numbers, and let q be a real number, 0 · q · 1. Let G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)) be the collection of all (±; T )-type games that have q-comprehensive payo® sets and¯-e®ective B-bounded groups.
Our results hold for all parameters ± and¯that are su±ciently small, that is, 2(± +¯) < m ¤ ; where m ¤ is a positive real number used in the de¯nition of the Hausdor® distance. (Since m ¤ can be chosen to be arbitrarily large, this requirement is nonrestrictive.)
3 Nonemptiness of approximate cores of games.
For TU games the concept of the core is attributed to Gilles [20] and unpublished research of Lloyd Shapley. The "-core was introduced for a TU game derived from an exchange economy in Shapley and Shubik [48] .
14 The "-core of an NTU game was introduced in Weber [56] , 15 Ichiishi and SchÄ a®er [26] and independently in Wooders [60] .
the core and the "-core. Let (N; V ) be a game. A payo® vector x is "-undominated if, for all S ½ N and y 2 V (S); it is not the case that y S >> x S +1 S ". The payo® vector x is feasible if x 2 V (N ). The "-core of a game (N; V ) consists of all feasible and "-undominated payo® vectors. When " = 0, the "-core is the core.
The "-remainder core.
The concept of the "-remainder core is based on the idea that all requirements of the core should at least be satis¯ed for almost all players with the remainder of players representing a small fraction of \unemployed" or \underemployed" players. The "-remainder core was suggested in Shubik [51] for an example involving bridge games and introduced in Wooders [61] 16 to demonstrate nonemptiness of \weak" approximate cores and to obtain the results published in Wooders [62] . 17 The "-remainder core subsequently appeared in Shubik and Wooders [54] , Kaneko and Wooders [27] , and other papers. This approximate core notion is frequently used as a stepping stone to other notions of approximate cores. There are game-theoretic situations, however, in which the notion of the "-remainder core may naturally arise { for example, the demand games of Selten [46] or multi-sided matching games with bounds on the numbers of players in an e®ective group the "-remainder core. Let (N; V ) be a game. A payo® vector x belongs to the "-remainder core if x is feasible and if, for some group S ½ N , jNj¡jSj jN j · " and x S belongs to the core of the subgame (S; V ).
Note that the following theorem requires no restrictions on the degree of comprehensiveness { the usual notion of comprehensiveness su±ces. Theorem 1. (Nonemptiness of the "-remainder core). Let T and B be positive integers and let q be a nonnegative real number satisfying q · 1. For any " > 0; there exists an integer´1("; T; B) such that if (a) (N; V ) 2 G q ((0; T ); (0; B)) and (b) jN j¸´1("; T; B) then the "-remainder core of (N; V ) is nonempty.
While the assumptions of Theorem 1 are strong { a¯xed number T of exact player types and strictly e®ective groups of size less than or equal to B; they provide a strong conclusion. The Theorem states that for any " > 0 there exists a lower bound´1("; T; B) on the number of the players such that all games satisfying the 16 The strategy of the proofs of this paper and [59] , [62] is similar to that of the current paper, except in the prior papers the results are restricted to games with a¯xed distribution of player types. Thus, to arrive at the¯nal result of these papers, the same sort of intermediate steps as in the current paper are used. From the Lemmas in Wooders ([61] , [62] ) analogues of the¯rst two nonemptiness results of the current paper, but for sequences of games with a¯xed distribution of player types, follow. Our current results are much stronger since the framework of parameterized collections is broader and we do not impose any relationships between individual games in a parameterized collection. 17 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging this detailed discussion of the history of the "-remainder core. We note that this concept has appeared under di®erent names, such as the weak "-core; the term "-remainder core is chosen since it seems the most informative.
assumptions with more than´1("; T; B) players have nonempty "-remainder cores. Since the bound depends only on "; T; and B, the bound is uniform across all the games characterized by the parameters; there is no restriction to replica games. Our result extends the result of Kaneko and Wooders [27] from replication sequences to arbitrary large games. As in Kaneko and Wooders [27] the result is independent of the characteristic function of the games; the same bound holds for all games in the collection parameterized by T and B.
To illustrate the application of Theorem 1, consider the collection of all games with at most two types of players and with two-person e®ective groups { marriage games, buyer-seller games, coalition production economies where two and only two workers are required for a productive group, and so on. Note that this collection of games cannot be described by a pregame { the collection is too large and cannot be accommodated by one space of player types and one worth function. Our result shows that given " > 0; provided the number of players in the game is su±ciently large; any game in the collection has a nonempty "-remainder core.
To give some intuition into Theorem 1 and the following Theorems, consider a particular game where all players are identical and only two-player groups are e®ective. It is immediate that the core of the game is nonempty if there is an even number of players. In fact, any even replication of a given game has a nonempty core. This doesn't depend on the payo® sets of the games; instead, it re°ects the fact that any set with an even number of players can be partitioned into two-person \optimal" groups. When the total number of players is odd, one player can be assigned his individually rational payo®; thus, given " > 0, for all su±ciently large total player sets, the "-remainder core is nonempty. 18 In Appendix we provide a general version of the result that when e®ective group sizes are bounded and there is a¯nite number of types of players, large player sets can be partitioned so that most players are in \optimal" groups. With this result in hand, Theorem 1 is immediate. Theorems 2 and 3 follow by approximation arguments.
3.2 The " 1 -remainder " 2 -core.
The requirements of the "-core were¯rst relaxed to allow an exceptional set of player, containing no more than the fraction " of the total player set in Wooders [61] and in Shubik and Wooders [54] . We provide a small re¯nement of the "-remainder core paper by allowing the fraction of players in the exceptional set to di®er from ". For this less restrictive de¯nition of the approximate core we can treat a signi¯cantly more general class of games than those of Theorem 1, in particular, we can allow approximate types (± > 0) and almost e®ective groups (¯> 0). For example, the class of models covered by our next Theorem includes replica models of economies with private goods as in Debreu and Scarf [17] and models of local public good economies satisfying per capita boundedness, as in [63] .
the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core. Let (N; V ) be a game. A payo® vector x belongs to the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core if x is feasible and if, for some group S ½ N , jNj¡jSj jN j · " 1 and x S belongs to the " 2 -core of the subgame (S; V ).
The following result extends the nonemptiness results of Wooders [59] , [62] , [65] , Shubik and Wooders [54] , and Wooders and Zame [70] , [71] from pregames to parameterized collections of games. 19 For the same values of the parameters T and B the bound on the sizes of games in the following theorem can be chosen to equal the bound in the preceding theorem. Note that there are no restrictions on the value of q except that it be greater than or equal to zero { strong comprehensiveness is not required.
Theorem 2. (Nonemptiness of the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core). Let T and B be positive integers and let q be a nonnegative real number satisfying q · 1. For any " 1 > 0 and " 2¸0 ; there exists an integer´1(" 1 ; T; B) such that if (a) (N; V ) 2 G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)) with ±¸0,¯¸0, (± +¯) · " 2 and (b) jN j¸´1(" 1 ; T; B) then the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core of (N; V ) is nonempty.
To describe the intuition behind Theorem 2, we begin with the same sort of example as discussed above where only two-player groups are e®ective. Suppose now that only two-player groups are e®ective but that the players are not identical, they are only all ±-substitutes for each other. Suppose that the total number of players is even. Consider a feasible payo® vector x that assigns the largest possible amount of payo® to each player, subject to the constraint that x has the equal-treatment property. Since all players are ±-substitutes, no two players can improve on x by more than ± for each player. Thus, x is in the ±-core. If there is an odd number of players and if " 1 > 1 jN j then the " 1 -remainder ±-core is nonempty; one player can be assigned his individually rational payo®. Now let us suppose that two-person groups are only¯-e®ective. When jN j is even, selecting x as in the preceding paragraph will lead to a payo® vector in the (± +¯)-core. When jN j is odd, the " 1 -remainder (± +¯)-core is nonempty for any " 1 satisfying " 1 > 1 jNj ; again, one player can be assigned his individually rational payo®. 19 Further nonemptiness results for approximate cores of NTU pregames have been obtained by Wooders and Zame in unpublished research. A copy of a typescript is available on request from the second author.
In e®ect, a parameterized collection of games G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)), by its de¯nition, can be approximated by the collection G q ((0; T ); (0; B)): Observe that by de¯nition the "-remainder 0-core coincides with the "-remainder core. Therefore, Theorem 2 is a strict generalization of Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 is a subcase for ± =¯= 0). But both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are based on the idea that some small proportion of the players can be ignored.
3.3
The "-core.
Our third Theorem provides conditions for the nonemptiness of the "-core of large games. The proof is based on the idea of compensating the \remainder" players from the previous theorems, as in [62] 
S).
Theorem 3. (Nonemptiness of the "-core). Let T and B be positive integers. Let C and q be positive real numbers with q · 1. For each " > 0 if (a) (N; V ) 2 G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)) with ±¸0,¯¸0, ± +¯< " and (b) (N; V ) has per capita payo® bound C; then there exists an integer´2(" ¡ (± +¯); T; B; C; q) such that the "-core of (N; V ) is nonempty whenever jN j¸´2(" ¡ (± +¯); T; B; C; q).
To describe the intuition behind Theorem 3, return again to the situation where all players are identical, only two-player groups are e®ective and jN j is odd. Suppose also that this is a game with side payments and any two-person group can earn 1; thus, the payo® vector ( ¡ "; y) is in the "-core where y = (jN j ¡ 1)". Informally, we can make transfers of " from each of jN j¡1 players in optimal groups to the reminder player so that every player has a payo® of at least ( 1 2 ¡ "). It follows that no group of players can signi¯cantly improve (by more than " in this case) upon such a payo®. The feature that per capita payo®s are bounded puts an upper bound on the required transfer to the remainder players. In games without side payments, the feature that q is greater than zero means that a small amount of payo® can be transferred from players in optimal groups to remainder players (but not necessarily at a one-to-one rate) until the remainder players are as well o® as those players in optimal groups, with the consequence that no group of players can signi¯cantly improve upon the resulting payo® vector. Now return to the situation where two-player groups are¯-e®ective and all players are ±-substitutes for each other,¯+± < ". As we've observed, if jN j is odd, the (±+¯)-core may be empty. When per capita payo®s are bounded and there is some means of making transfers (q > 0) then, for su±ciently large jN j ; it's possible to begin with some payo® vector in the (" ¡ ± ¡¯)-remainder (± +¯)-core, and make transfers to the remainder players so that, no group could improve on the resulting payo® by " for each player.
We note that the assumption of per capita boundedness is actually stronger than required. For our proofs (as the proof of [62] ) we may use only the fact that the set of equal-treatment payo® vectors satisfy the per capita boundedness condition.
An example in Appendix shows indispensability of the condition in Theorem 3 that q is greater than zero, thus clarifying the need for this condition in Theorem 3 in contrast to our previous theorems. Indispensability of the other conditions of Theorem 3 is demonstrated by the examples in Subsection 3.6. The following Corollary shows that Theorem 3 can be applied to obtain nonemptiness of approximate cores of games that are \close" to q-comprehensiveness games (with q > 0). 20 The proof of this result is left to the reader.
Corollary. (Nonemptiness with near q-comprehensiveness). Let (N; W ) be a game. Suppose that for some and " > 0 there exist a game (N; V ) 2 G q ((±; T ); (¯; B)) with 0 < q · 1; ±¸0;¯¸0; (± +¯) < " such that:
(a) (N; V ) has per capita payo® bound C,
·°2 for all S ½ N; where°< " ¡ (± +¯), and (c) jN j¸´2(" ¡ (± +¯+°); T; B; C; q). Then the "-core of (N; W ) is nonempty.
We remark that in [62] , to obtain nonemptiness of approximate cores, q-comprehensiveness is not required. To obtain her equal-treatment result, however, Wooders employs approximating games satisfying strong comprehensiveness. A similar idea is at work in our Corollary. If there is another game (N; V ) with payo® sets close { within°2 { to those of (N; W ) and (N; V ) satis¯es the conditions of Theorem 3, it is not necessary that the game (N; W ) itself satis¯es those conditions. In these circumstances, we can¯nd a payo® vector that is in the (" ¡°)-core of (N; V ) and adjust this payo® vector so that it is in the "-core of (N; W ). In essence, this is similar to the sort of approximation technique used for our Theorems 2 and 3. 20 Any comprehensive payo® set can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a q-comprehensive payo® set, for q small ( [62] , Appendix).
A simple example of a production economy.
The following example illustrates the application of our results to a familiar sort of situation { one with¯rms and workers. The example also illustrates the application of our results to situations where there is a compact metric space of player types, essentially a special case. Example 1. Suppose a pregame has two sorts of players,¯rms and workers. 21 The set of possible types of workers is given by the points in the interval [0; 1) and the set of possible types of¯rms is given by the points in the interval [1; 2] : To derive a game from the information given above, let N be any¯nite player set and let » be an attribute function, that is, a function from N into [0; 2]. In interpretation, if »(i) 2 [0; 1) then i is a worker and if »(i) 2 [1; 2] then i is ā rm. Firms can pro¯tably hire up to three workers and the payo® to a¯rm i and a set of workers W (i) ½ N , containing no more than 3 members, is given
Workers and¯rms can earn positive payo® only by cooperating so v(fig) = 0 for all i 2 N . For any group S ½ N de¯ne v(S) as the maximum payo® the group S could realize by splitting into groups containing either workers only, or 1¯rm and no more than 3 workers. This completes the speci¯cation of the game.
We leave it to the reader to verify that for any positive integer m every game derived from the pregame is a member of the class G 1 ((
; 2m); (0; 4)) and has a per capita bound of 2. Theorem 3 states that given For this example, an exact bound on jN j can be calculated. However it was not an intension of the present paper to provide precise bounds; we refer the reader to another of our papers [35] for computation of bounds.
Per capita boundedness and small group e®ectiveness.
Our¯nal result, Theorem 3, requires both per capita boundedness and small group e®ectiveness. As noted previously, in the context of pregames with side payments, when arbitrarily small percentages of players of any particular type is ruled out, then these two conditions are equivalent. But in important economic contexts, neither condition implies the other. The next example illustrates a voting games satisfying per capita boundedness. There is only one player type in each game so the \thickness" condition of the equivalence result of [67] is satis¯ed. But small group e®ectiveness does not hold and Theorem 3 does not apply. We can think of the games as a sequence of voting games where a winning group must contain 2 3 of the population, for example, impeachment of a President of the United States or rati¯cation of a treaty in some parliaments.
Observe that each game in the sequence has one exact player type and a per capita bound of 1. That is, q = 1; T = 1; C = 1; and ± = 0: However, the 1 7 -core of the game is empty for arbitrarily large values of m:
To see that the 1 7 -core is empty, observe that for any feasible payo® vector there are m players that are assigned, in total, no more than m: There are another m players that get in total no more than 2m 2m m = m: These 2m players can form a group and receive 2m in total. This group can improve upon the given payo® vector for each of its members by 1 6 ; since (2m ¡ 
:
The following example, of matching games with widespread positive externalities, illustrates economic situations where, because of small group e®ectiveness, "-remainder cores are nonempty for positive ", but per capita boundedness does not hold and Theorem 3 does not apply.
Example 3.
A matching game with widespread positive externalities. 22 The economic situation we've in mind is one where any two players can carry out some job but their reward from the job depends on the size of the economy in which they live. are members of the collection of games with one exact player type and strictly e®ective small groups of two. That is, q = 1; T = 1; B = 2; and ± =¯= 0: Given " > 0 the "-remainder core of the game 22 A similar example in Wooders and Zame [70] .
(N m ; v m ) is nonempty for all m satisfying 1 2m+1 < ". However, the 1 7 -core of the game is empty for arbitrarily large values of m; the remainder player cannot be compensated by the sum of taxes on the players in two-person groups:
To see that the 1 7 -core is empty, observe that for any feasible payo® vector there is a player whose payo® is no more than
: There is another player whose payo® must be no more than : Obviously, together this two-player group can improve upon the given payo® by 1 6 for each member of the group: 3.6 Remarks. Remark 1. q-comprehensiveness or convexity? It is possible to obtain a result similar to Theorem 3 using convexity of payo® sets and \thickness" instead of qcomprehensiveness (see [34] ). Strong comprehensiveness, however, can be naturally satis¯ed by games derived from economies. Moreover, \1-strongly comprehensive games" are games with side payments, so we can incorporate this important special case. Furthermore, in models of economies with local public goods or with clubs, convexity may be di±cult to satisfy. Although examples show that none of the assumptions can be omitted, our Corollary relaxes q-comprehensiveness.
Remark 2. Exact bounds. It may be possible to compute the bounds on the size of the total player sets given in Theorems 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the parameters describing the games. A simple bound is obtained in [35] , although under somewhat di®erent assumptions. Also, the proofs of that paper, relative to those of this paper, are quite complex. Remark 3. Absolute or relative sizes? It is possible to obtain similar results with bounds on relative sizes of e®ective groups. In a¯nite game with a given number of players, assumptions on absolute sizes and on relative sizes of e®ective groups are equivalent. We have chosen to develop our results using bounds on absolute sizes of near-e®ective groups since this seems to re°ect typical economic and social situations. Examples include: marriage and matching models (see Kelso and Crawford [32] and Roth and Sotomayor [44] ); models of economies with shared goods and crowding (see Conley and Wooders [12] ) for a survey); and private goods exchange economies (see Mas-Colell [38] and Kaneko and Wooders [29] for example). In fact, assumptions on proportions of economic agents typically occur only when there is a continuum of players, cf. Ostroy [41] ).
Remark 4. Limiting gains to group formation. In the pregame framework several di®erent conditions limiting returns to group formation have been used. For situations with a¯xed distribution of a¯nite number of player types, Wooders [59] , [62] and Shubik and Wooders [54] require per capita boundedness. To treat compact metric spaces of player types, Wooders and Zame [70] , [71] require boundedness of marginal contributions to groups while Wooders [65] , [66] requires the less restrictive condition of small group e®ectiveness. As noted in the introduction, in the context of games derived from pregames, small group e®ectiveness and per capita boundedness are equivalent. In Subsection 3.5, we have shown that in the broader framework of parameterized collections of games both¯-e®ective B-bounded groups and per capita boundedness are required.
Remark 5.
Relationships between the Theorems. The notions of the "-core and the "-remainder core are conceptually independent of each other, while the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core combines features of both. One may wonder if nonemptiness of the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core (Theorem 2) can be deduced from the nonemptiness of the "-core and the "-remainder core (Theorems 1 and 3) . The assumptions required for Theorems 1 and 3, however, are strictly stronger than those for Theorem 2; thus, while a less general nonemptiness result for the " 1 -remainder core " 2 -core can be deduced from the other two results, Theorem 2, requiring weaker assumptions, cannot be. Indeed, none of the Theorems can be deduced from the others.
Economies with clubs.
We de¯ne admissible club structures in terms of natural properties and take as given the set of all admissible club structures for each group of players. Generalizing MasColell's [39] notion of public projects to club activities, there is no necessary linear structure on the set of club activities. Indeed, our results could be obtained even without any linear structure on the space of private commodities. We remark that it would be possible to separate crowding types of players (those observable characteristics that a®ect the utilities of others, or, in other words, their external characteristics) from taste types, as in Conley and Wooders [10] , [11] , and have players' roles as club members depend on their crowding types. In those papers, however, the separation of crowding type and taste type has an important role; the authors show that prices for public goods { or club membership prices { need only depend on observable characteristics of players and not on their preferences. The current paper treats only the core; at this point separation of taste and crowding type would have no essential role.
agents. There are T \types" of agents. Let ½ = (½ 1 ; :::; ½ T ) be a given pro¯le, called the population pro¯le. The set of agents is given by N ½ = f(t; q) : q = 1; :::; ½ t and t = 1; :::; T g; and (t; q) is called the q th agent of type t. It will later be required that all agents of the same type may play the same role in club structures. For example, in a traditional marriage model, all females could have the role of \wife". De¯ne N ½ [t] := f(t; q) : q = 1; :::; ½ t g. For our¯rst Proposition members of N ½ [t] will be exact substitutes for each other and for our next two Propositions, approximate substitutes.
commodities. The economy has L private goods. A vector of private goods is denoted by y = (y 1 ; :::; y`; :::
clubs. A club is a nonempty subset of players. For each club S ½ N ½ , a club structure of S; denoted by S, is a set of clubs whose union coincides with S: The set of admissible club structures for S, denoted by C(S); is assumed to be nonempty for any S 6 = ;. This assumption ensures that a club of one player has a unique admissible club structurea singleton set. The sets C(S) are also required to satisfy the following two properties:
1. If S and S 0 are nonempty disjoint subsets of players and S and S 0 are admissible club structures of S and S 0 respectively, then fC : C 2 S S S 0 g is an admissible club structure of S S S 0 (unions of admissible club structures of disjoint groups are admissible club structures of the unions of the groups).
Let S and S
0 be subsets of players with the same pro¯les, let S be an admissible club structure of S and let ' be a type-preserving 1-1 mapping from S onto S 0 (that is, if (t; q) 2 S then '((t; q)) = (t; q 0 ) for some q 0 = 1; :::; ½ t ). Then
is an admissible club structure of S 0 (admissible club structures depend only on pro¯les, that is, all players of the same type have the same roles in clubs).
The¯rst property is necessary to ensure that the game derived from the economy is superadditive. It corresponds to economic situations where one option open to a group is to form smaller groups. Since the singletons are always admissible club structures for clubs of one player, this property implies that the partition of any set S ½ N ½ , S 6 = ;, into singletons is an admissible club structure for S. The second property corresponds to the idea that the opportunities open to a group depend on the pro¯le of the group. club activities. For each club C there is a given set of club activities A(C): An element ® of A(C) requires input x(C; ®) 2 R L of private goods. For any two clubs C and C 0 with the same pro¯le we require that if ® 2 A(C), then ® 2 A(C 0 ) and x(C; ®) = x(C 0 ; ®): For 1-player clubs f(t; q)g, we assume that there is an activity ® 0 with x(f(t; q)g; ® 0 ) = 0, that is, there is an activity requiring no use of inputs.
preferences and endowments. Only private goods are endowed. Let ! tq 2 R L + be the endowment of the (t; q) th participant of private goods.
Given S ½ N ½ , (t; q) 2 S, and a club structure S of S, the consumption set of the (t; q) th player (relative to S) is given by
where X tq (S) ½ R L is the private goods consumption set relative to S, assumed to be closed. Note that the private goods part of the consumption set of a player, X tq (S), may depend on the club structure; one function of a club may be to provide certain private goods to its members. The entire consumption set of the (t; q) th player is given by
We assume that the (t; q) th player can subsist in isolation. That is
It is also assumed that for each (t; q); each S ½ N ½ ; (t; q) 2 S, and each club structure S of S, the preferences of the (t; q) th agent are represented by a continuous utility function u tq (¢; S) de¯ned on © tq (S).
states of the economy. Let S be a nonempty subset of N ½ and let S be a club structure of S. A feasible state of the economy S relative to S, or simply a state for S, is a pair (y S ; ® S ) where:
(a) y S = fy tq g (t;q)2S with y tq 2 X tq (S) for (t; q) 2 S;
(b) ® S = f® C g C2S with ® C 2 A(C) for C 2 S; and (c) the allocation of private goods is feasible, that is,
feasible payo®s vectors. A payo® vector U = (¹ u tq ) (t;q)2N½ is feasible for a group S if u tq = 0 for all (t; q) 2 N ½ nS and there is club structure S of S and a feasible state of the economy for S relative to S; (y S ; ® S ); such that u tq = u tq (y tq ; ® S ; S) for each (t; q) 2 S. the game induced by the economy. For each group S ½ N ½ ; de¯ne
there is a payo® vector (¹ u tq ) (t;q)2S that is feasible for S and b u tq · u tq for all (t; q) 2 S; b u tq = 0 for all (t; q) = 2 Sg:
It is immediate that the player set N ½ and function V determine a game (N ½ ; V ) with comprehensive payo® sets.
"-domination. Let N ½ be a club structure of the total player set N ½ and let (y N½ ; ® N½ ) be a feasible state of the economy N ½ relative to N ½ . A group S can "-dominate the state (y N½ ; ® N½ ) if there is a club structure S = fS 1 ; :::; S K g of S and a feasible state (y 0S ; ® 0S ) for the economy S such that for all consumers (t; q) 2 S it holds that
the core of the economy and "-cores. A state (y N½ ; ® N½ ) of the economy N ½ relative to N ½ is in the core of the economy if it cannot be 0-dominated by any group S. It is clear that if (y N½ ; ® N½ ) is a state in the core of the economy then the utility vector induced by that state is in the core of the induced game. Similarly, if (¹ u tq ) (t;q)2N½ is in the core of the game induced by an economy then there is a state in the core of the economy (y N½ ; ® N½ ) such that the utility vector induced by that state is (¹ u tq ) (t;q)2N ½ . Notions of the "-remainder core, the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core, and the "-core of the economy are de¯ned in the obvious way.
Nonemptiness of approximate cores.
To obtain our results we require few restrictions on the economy. Our¯rst Proposition requires exact player types and strictly e®ective small groups. It applies naturally to the sorts of matching models considered in Roth and Sotomayer [44] or Crawford [14] , for example.
(A.0) For each t and all q; q 0 2 f1; :::; ½ t g; u tq (¢) = u tq 0 (¢) and ! tq = ! tq 0 : In addition, in the game induced by the economy the players (t; q) and (t; q 0 ) are exact substitutes. (All players of the same type are identical in terms of their endowments, preferences and crowding types { their e®ects on others.) (A.1) There is a bound B such that for any population pro¯le ½; any group S ½ N ½ ;
and any club structure S of S, if U = (¹ u tq : (t; q) 2 S) is a feasible payo® vector for the club structure S then there is a partition of S into groups, say fS 1 ; :::; S K g and club structures of these groups, fS 1 ; :::; S K g such that for each k,¯¯S k¯· B and U k := (u tq : (t; q) 2 S k ) is a feasible payo® vector for S k :
Our approach requires that for each group S, the set of individually rational and feasible payo®s is compact, (A.2) below. This can be ensured by assuming, for example, in addition to (A.1), that: (i) there is a bound on the number of clubs to which an agent can belong; (ii) for any club in any admissible club structure, the set of club activities A(C) is compact and (iii) the consumption of private goods sets X tq (S) are bounded below for any admissible club structure S of S. More general economic environments will also ensure compactness but for the purposes of this example, we prefer to keep the assumptions relatively simple.
(A.2) For each subset of players S ½ N ½ the set V (S) \ R N + is compact.
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The following result is an immediate application of Theorem 1. Proposition 1. (Nonemptiness of the "-remainder core) . Let T and B be positive integers. Assume (A.0)-(A.2) hold. Given " > 0; there exists an integeŕ Proposition 1 is most natural if there is some composite commodity { one private good or, given prices of private goods, money { or if private goods are indivisible so that all gains from trade in private goods can be realized by trade within groups of bounded sizes. If we require only nonemptiness of the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core we can weaken the restrictions on the economy { players of the same type need only be approximate substitutes and small groups need only be nearly e®ective. For brevity, these assumptions will not be made on the primitives of the economy. Thus, instead of (A.0) and (A.1), for the following two Propositions, we will assume (A.0 0 ) and (A. (A.1 0 ) There are¯¸0 and an integer B so that the game derived from the economy has¯-e®ective B-bounded groups.
Then the following result, for the " 1 -reminder " 2 -core, follows from Theorem 2.
Proposition 2. (Nonemptiness of the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core). Let T and B be positive integers. Given " 2¸0 ; assume (A.0 0 ), (A.1 0 ) and (A.2) hold and (± +¯) · " 2 . Given " 1 > 0; there exists an integer´1(" 1 ; T; B) such that if ½, the pro¯le of the economy, satis¯es the property that k½k¸´1(" 1 ; T; B) then the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core of the economy is nonempty.
To motivate the above result, one might suppose that, in general, group,¯rm or club sizes are not bounded nor is there only a bounded number of player types. Even 23 Note that for those results which require q-comprehensiveness for q > 0, the sets V (S) cannot be compactly generated. But had we de¯ned q-comprehensiveness only for each set V (S) \ M ¤ , then instead of assuming (A.2) we could assume instead that V (S) is compactly generated. In fact, other than for further notational complexity, our theorems would remain unchanged by requiring q-comprehensiveness only on the sets V (S) \ M ¤ .
if group sizes are strictly bounded, all players may di®er. One may view Proposition 2 as providing justi¯cation for the study of the situations described by Proposition 1. For our next result, to ensure q-comprehensiveness for some q > 0, we assume that the L th commodity is a sort of \quasi-money" for which everyone has a separable preference. Let y tq ¡L ; and X tq ¡L (S) denote the restriction of y tq 2 R L and X tq (S) respectively to their¯rst (L ¡ 1) coordinates. We assume that, for some real number q ¤ 2 (0; 1], the marginal utility of the L th commodity, for all su±ciently large amounts of the commodity, is greater than or equal to q ¤ :
For good L and all players (t; q) 2 N ½ ; for any state of the economy (y S ; ® S ) it holds that : (A.4) (per capita boundedness): There is a constant C such that the condition of per capita boundedness is satis¯ed by the games derived from the economies.
Assumption (A.3) ensures that starting from any allocation, through redistribution of good L the wealth can always be transferred to the \remainder players" at a rate that is allowed to depend on the allocation but is restricted to be between q ¤ and 1. This assumption implies q ¤ -comprehensiveness of the game derived from the economy.
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A simple example of (A.3) is that utility functions are linear in the L th commodity with some positive slope. Speci¯cally, for some positive constant b tq for each type t,
tq were equal to one for each player then the economy would have \transferable utility."
26 Notice however that our conditions allow much more general forms of the 24 The condition that the L th commodity can be consumed in arbitrarily large negative amounts signi¯cantly simpli¯es the example. This condition could be relaxed but at some cost in terms of complexity and the length of this paper. 25 Such an assumption, in the literature on private goods economies with indivisibilities, goes back at least to Broome [7] . It was introduced in the club/local public good literature in several papers due to Wooders, for example [63] . 26 It would be more appropriate, in some respects, to reserve the term \games with side payments" to the situations permitted by (A.3) since, according to the common usage of the words, (A.3) permits side payments while \transferable utility" requires that the side payments can be made at a one-to-one rate.
utility of the L th commodity, for example,
for any values b [23] , that the endowment is preferred to any bundle containing only indivisible (in our case, club) goods but, for our purposes here, we prefer to avoid this additional complexity.
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The next result follows from Theorem 3. 
Further applications.
The class of economies de¯ned above is very broad. The results can be applied to extend results already in the literature on economies with group structures, such as those with local public goods (called club economies by some authors), cf., Shubik and Wooders [52] .
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For example, there is a number of papers showing core-equilibrium equivalence in nite economies with local public goods and one private good and satisfying strict e®ectiveness of small groups, cf., Conley and Wooders [13] and references therein. In these economies, from the results of Wooders [62] and Shubik and Wooders [54] , existence of approximate equilibrium where an exceptional set of agents is ignored is immediate. (Just take the largest subgame having a nonempty core and consider the equilibria for that subeconomy; ignore the remainder of the consumers.) Our results allow the immediate extension of these results to results for all su±ciently large economies { no restriction to replication sequences is required. 27 Were we to weaken (A.3) we could also modify our notion of q-comprehensiveness so that it is required only on the sets V (S) \ M ¤ for some appropriate set M ¤ . See also footnote 20. 28 The results of this paper are easily available in Shubik and Wooders [53] , on-line on the second author's web page.
Conclusions.
Except in certain idealized situations, cores of games are typically empty. This has the consequences that important classes of economies typically have empty cores and a competitive equilibrium does not exist. Examples include economies with indivisibilities and other nonconvexities, economies with public goods subject to crowding, and production economies with non-constant returns to scale. The standard justi¯cation for convexity, assumed in Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie models of exchange economies, is that the economies are \large," rendering nonconvexities negligible { the convexifying e®ect of large numbers. Similarly results on nonemptiness of approximate cores rely on large numbers of players and the balancing e®ect of large numbers. An important aspect of our results in this paper is that they are for arbitrary games and the bounds depend on the parameters describing the games; the compact metric space of player types assumed in previous work is a special case. Moreover, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
It appears that the framework of parametrized collections of games and our approach will have a number of uses. In ongoing research this framework is used to demonstrate further market-like properties of arbitrary games 29 : approximate cores are nearly symmetric (treat similar players similarly); arbitrary games are approximately market games and; arbitrary games satisfy a \law of scarcity," dictating that an increase in the abundance of players of a given type does not increase the core payo® vectors to members of that type. In addition, some initial results have been obtained on convergence of cores and approximate cores. A particularly promising direction appears to be the application of ideas of lottery equilibrium in games of Garratt and Qin [19] to parameterized collections of games. Another possible application is to games with asymmetric information, as in Allen [1] , for example, and Forges, Heifetz and Minelli [18] . 30 6 Appendix.
Mathematical foundations: Partition-balanced pro¯les.
This subsection formalizes a key idea about pro¯les that underlies the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games. Throughout this subsection, let the number of types of players be¯xed at T . Thus, every pro¯le f has T components and f 2 Z T . Our key de¯nitions follow. replicas of a pro¯le. Given a pro¯le f and a positive integer r; the pro¯le rf is called the r th replica of f:
The Lemma 1 below is a very important step. It states that, for any pro¯le f; there is a replica of that pro¯le that is B-partition-balanced. The smallest such replication number is called the depth of the pro¯le. (f; B) ; the depth of f , such that, for any positive integer k, the pro¯le kr(f; B)f is B-partition-balanced.
We refer the reader to Kaneko and Wooders [27] for a proof.
31 For a recent discussion and an interesting application of this sort of result to dynamic matching processes, see Myerson [40] . The following concept of "-B-partition-balanced pro¯les completes our construction.
"-B-partition-balanced pro¯les. Given a positive integer B and a non-negative real number "; 0 · " · 1; a pro¯le f is "-B-partition-balanced if there is a subpro¯le f 0 of f such that
The next result is key: given " > 0 and B; any su±ciently large pro¯le is "-Bpartition-balanced. Note that this result is uniform across all large pro¯les.
Fundamental Proposition. (The partition-balancing e®ect of large numbers). Given a positive integer B and a positive real number "; 0 < " · 1; there is a positive integer k("; B) such that any pro¯le f with kf k¸k("; B) is "-B-partitionbalanced.
A technical lemma is required. Denote by k¢k the sum-metric in R T , that is, for x; y 2 R T ; kx ¡ yk := 31 The reader may also derive the proof from [62] , Lemmas 3 and 5.
Obviously, f 0 is a pro¯le (f 0 2 Z T + ) and f 0 · g · f: Suppose that k 0 > 0: (This is the only relevant case since we are concerned only with \su±ciently large" pro¯les { that is, those pro¯les for which k 0 is greater than zero. See below.) Then
Moreover, the pro¯le f 0 is B-partition-balanced since it is a replica of the pro¯le y ¤ : Now, de¯ne k("; B) := M(´0; B)´0 2 "
: If kf k¸k ("; B) ; then
kf k :
¡ "; and f 0 is B-partition-balanced.
6.2 Proofs of the Theorems. By Theorem 1, if jN j¸´1("; T; B) then the " 1 -remainder core of the game (N; V 00 ) is nonempty. That is, there exists S ½ N such that jNj¡jSj jN j · " 1 and such that (S; V ) has a nonempty core. Let x be a payo® vector in the core of the game (S; V 00 ). Since V 00 (S) ½ V (S), the payo® vector x is feasible for (S; V ). Since H 1 [V 00 (S); V (S)] · + ± and x is in the core of (S; V 00 ), x is (¯+ ±)-undominated for the game (S; V ). Since (¯+ ±) · x 2 and jNj¡jSj jNj · " 1 , x is in the " 1 -remainder " 2 -core of (N; V ).
Proof of Theorem 3:
As in the proof of Theorem 2¯rst construct the game (N; V 00 ) 2 G q ((0; T ); (0; B)). As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, V 00 (S) ½ V (S) and H 1 [V 00 (S); V (S)] ·¯+ ± for any S ½ N . In addition, the game (N; V 00 ) has a per capita bound of C. To simplify notations let us de¯ne " 1 = "¡(¯+±) > 0. Recall that we required 2(¯+ ±) < m ¤ . Assume¯rst that 2" 1 · m ¤ : Thus " = (" 1 +¯+ ±) < m ¤ . Applying Theorem 1 for " 0 := q BC " 1 to the game (N; V 00 ) we found that for jN j¸´1(" 0 ; B; T ) there is some subset of players S ½ N with jNj¡jSj jNj
· " 0 such that the game (S; V 00 ) has a nonempty core. Let x be a payo® vector in the core of (S; V 00 ). We now construct a payo® vector y 2 R N for the game (N; V 00 ): For i 2 S, de¯ne y i := x i ¡ " 1 and for i = 2 S, de¯ne y i := BC ¡ " 1 . Observe that y is in the " 1 -core of the game (S; V 00 ). We next need to show that y 2 V (N ). Since Since q · 1, it follows that q" 1 jSj¸(BC ¡ " 1 )(jN j ¡ jSj):
Informally, this means that we can take " 1 away from each player in S, transfer this amount to the players in N nS at the rate q; and increase the payo® to each player in N nS to BC ¡ " 1 : Therefore since x 2 V 00 (S) ½ V (S); by superadditivity and by q-comprehensiveness of payo® sets it holds that y 2 V (N ).
We now prove that the payo® vector y is " 1 -undominated in the game (N; V 00 ). (We then proceed to show that y is "-undominated in the game (N; V )). The strategy of the proof is to show that if y is " 1 -dominated in the game (N; V 00 ) then it can be " 1 -dominated by some group (to be called) A ½ S: We thus obtain a contradiction. The proof proceeds through two steps.
The¯rst step is to construct the group A. Suppose that y is " 1 -dominated in the game (N; V 00 ) by some group W: Speci¯cally, suppose there exists a payo® vector z such that z 2 V 00 (W ) = c q (V 0 (W ; B)) and that is, A consists of those members of subsets in fW k g that are contained in S and A L consists of those members of subsets of fW k g that contain at least one player from N nS:
The second step is to show that the set A is nonempty and the player set [ W k 2A can " 1 -dominate the payo® vector y. Since y is in the " 1 -core of the subgame (S; V 00 ) it is clear that the group W must contain at least one member of N nS; if not, a contradiction is immediate. Therefore the set A L must be nonempty. Since A ½ S; this is a contradiction to the construction of y as a payo® vector in the " 1 -core of the game (S; V 00 ): We conclude that y is " 1 -undominated in the game (N; V 00 ). Since the payo® vector y is " 1 -undominated in the game (N; V 00 ), for jN j1 ( q BC " 1 ; B; T ) the payo® vector y is in the " 1 -core of the game (N; V 00 ). This implies that y is feasible and (" 1 +¯+ ±)-undominated in the initial game (N; V ), providing that jN j¸´1( q BC " 1 ; B; T ). Let´2(" 1 ; B; T; C; q) :=´1( q BC " 1 ; B; T ). Thus, we proved that for jN j¸´2(" ¡ (¯+ ±); B; T; C; q) the "-core of the game (N; V ) is nonempty.
For " 1 > ; B; T; C; q). Then for jN j¸´2(" ¡ (¯+ ±); B; T; C; q) again the "-core of the game (N; V ) is nonempty.
Final Example.
This example shows indispensability of the condition in Theorem 3 that q is greater than zero, thus clarifying the need for this condition in Theorem 3 in contrast to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. where the m th game has 2m + 1 players: Suppose that any player alone can earn only 0 units or less. Suppose that any two-player group can distribute a total payo® of 2 units in any agreed-upon way, while there is no transferability of payo® between groups. Suppose only one-and two-player groups are e®ective. Then the game is described by the following parameters: q = 0; T = 1; B = 2; ± =¯= 0: Moreover, the game has per capita bound C = 1: Thus the game satis¯es strict small group e®ectiveness and per capita boundedness. However, the 1 3 -core of the game is empty for arbitrarily large values of m: (At any feasible payo® vector, at least one player gets 0 units and some other player no more than 1 unit. These two players can form a group and gain 1 2 each.)
